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PROF. WILLIAM T. PIZZI
FACT-BARGAINING: AN AMERICAN
PHENOMENON
William T. Pizzi*
The Probation Officers' survey suggests that
there is considerable "fact-bargaining" going in
federal courts. By that it is meant that plea agree-
ments are being drawn up for use in sentencing to
provide guideline calculations that are not accurate or
complete in all respects. Comments in the survey
suggest that in order to protect such agreements,
prosecutors sometimes limit the access of the proba-
tion officer to information about the offense or may
even go so far as to instruct agents not to discuss the
case with the probation officer. When a dispute over
facts does occur between the version of the offense
offered by the probation officer in the presentence
report and that put forward by the parties in the plea
agreement, the survey suggests that judges tend to
uphold the plea agreement.
One obvious inference seems to be that a
significant number of offenders do not receive the
punishment prescribed by the guidelines because the
information on which the sentence is based does not
accurately reflect certain offense or offender charac-
teristics. It is certainly possible to read the survey as
suggesting that serious problems exist with the
guideline system that need to be addressed. But my
own view is that the problems that encourage fact-
bargaining are much deeper than simply the guide-
line system and unless we are willing to address
serious structural weaknesses in the system, the
concerns raised by the survey are probably not worth
worrying about.
I. Sentence Bargaining and the American
Criminal Justice System
I start from the premise that the American
criminal justice system in 1996 is a system of negotia-
tion and compromise and truth is of secondary
importance. Many times we see plea bargains in
which the state takes "half a loaf," as murder cases
are pled down to manslaughter cases and aggravated
sexual assaults are pled down to improper sexual
contact cases with corresponding reductions in the
sentencing ranges. Does anyone really think that a
defendant's rap sheet accurately describes the crimes
the defendant committed on prior occasions?
Not only are convictions subject to negotiation
and compromise in the United States but we know
that it is not unusual to compromise cases through
outright sentence bargaining in which the prosecutor
promises the defendant a specific maximum sentence
in order to convince him to enter a guilty plea. If the
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case against the defendant is strong, the prosecutor
may hold out for a sentence that she believes to be
proportionate to the offense and the offender. But if
there are problems in the case-perhaps a potential
suppression issue or prosecution witnesses who may
not be attractive to the jury-a prosecutor may have
to agree to a sentence that is less-sometimes far
less-than anyone believes the defendant deserves for
the crime in question.
Against this background, it ought not to be
surprising that the carefully graduated sentencing
guideline system can lead to some manipulation by
the parties to achieve a certain sentence. Admittedly,
the federal system has traditionally been an island of
resistance to sentence bargaining, but the survey
suggests that this is eroding under the sentencing
guidelines.
Viewed against the background of the entire
American criminal justice system, it is hard for me to
work up too much concern over manipulation of the
guidelines in federal court to achieve a certain
sentence. This is not to say that I like the fact that
prosecutors and defense attorneys in the plea agree-
ment may not be honest about the amount of drugs
involved in the crime or that they may undervalue the
amount of money defrauded from victims. Nor do I
like the fact that prosecutors keep their case files close
to their chests and limit the information that the
probation officer receives so that certain plea agree-
ments will be accepted by the court. If we are to have
plea bargaining and sentence bargaining systems, I
would prefer a system that was more honest and
open about what is going on. But to condemn plea
bargaining because the truth is being distorted by
such actions and defendants are not receiving the full
measure of punishment they deserve seems as
hypocritical to me as Captain Renault's announce-
ment in Casablanca that he is closing Rick's because he
"is shocked, shocked to find that there is gambling
going on in here."
The American criminal justice system has ceased
to be a trial system in the way other western systems
remain trial systems; it is a system of negotiation and
compromise. That sentence bargaining is beginning
to emerge in the federal system ought not surprise us.
II. The Usurpation of Judicial Power?
There is another aspect of the survey that
deserves discussion: the results suggest that when
there is an inconsistency between the description of
the offense presented in the presentence report and
the description offered by the plea agreement, judges
tend to defer to the plea agreement. Why would
judges defer in that way to the parties? Perhaps it is
evidence of hostility to the guidelines or maybe
judges do not want trials if they can be avoided. But I
don't think we can limit such deference to guidelines
or to the federal system. How often do state court
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judges in serious cases reject plea bargains offered by
the parties? Very rarely.
I suggest that there are structural reasons that
make it much harder for judges to reject bargains
offered by the parties. For one thing, judges do not
know cases as well as the parties do and are not in a
position to easily discover why a prosecutor or
defense attorney was moved to accept the bargain in
question. A second reason why judges defer to the
parties is that the parties have far greater control over
the presentation of the case in the United States than
in other western countries.
By comparison, in continental countries, judges
are assigned the cental responsibility for the conduct
of the trial. As an initial matter, no knowledge gap
exists between the judges and the parties: everyone
has access to the full investigative file and all the
information it contains. In addition, there is no
separation between trial and sentencing-both issues
are decided at trial and it is the obligation of the panel
of judges to control the development of evidence at
trial, to determine whether the defendant committed
the crime charged and to impose an appropriate
sentence if the defendant is guilty. The state's
attorney and the defense attorney play roles that are
supplementary and clearly secondary to that of the
judges. For a judge in this system to defer to an
agreement worked out by the parties would be
inconsistent with his or her institutional obligations.
In the United States, the role of the trial judge is
much weaker. It is not the responsibility of the trial
judge to present or develop evidence at trial. If there
is an imbalance in the skills of the prosecutor and the
defense attorney such that the defense attorney is far
more experienced and capable, is it the responsibility
of the judge to intervene to see that the trial is fair? If
the defense attorney asks a witness a line of questions
that might confuse the jury or makes an improper
closing argument that misstates the law, is it the
responsibility of the judge to intervene sua sponte? I
suggest that the problems that manifested themselves
at the Simpson trial and that have brought down on
Judge Ito's head a raft of criticisms are to some extent
structural problems that the system needs to address.
Our trial system seems unable to distinguish between
representing a client and becoming the client's alter
ego or between putting forward arguments on a
client's behalf and attempting to manipulate the jury
at every turn. At the same time that advocacy has
become more extreme, the authority of trial judges to
influence the direction of the trial and to impose
controls over the advocates in their courtrooms has
been eroded, in part by a relationship between
appellate courts and trial courts that encourages and
even demands close appellate scrutiny of what
occurred at trial to see if there may have been an error.
It may seem startling to suggest that trial judges
in the United States, including federal judges, are
weak and lack the power of judges in other systems
when American judges are armed with powers, such
as the power to declare statutes unconstitutional, that
have no analog in most other western legal systems.
But when you look at the responsibility that judges
have for the determination of truth, American judges
are weaker than judges in other systems. To make
my point from a different angle, let me offer a brief
contrast between our criminal trial system and that in
England.
III. Contrasting Adversary Systems
It often seems that the United States is commit-
ted to the adversary system almost as a matter of
metaphysical belief. Criminal cases arp conceived of
as two-sided battles with the prosecutor, the victim,
and any number of police agencies all aligned on one
side of the case trying to convict the defendant.
Consistent with that model, and this is especially true
of the federal system, prosecutors are deeply in-
volved in the investigation of the crime and often
make decisions from the initial stages of the case up
through trial.
By contrast, in England the prosecution barrister
(like the defense barrister) is simply a barrister hired
to present that particular case at trial. The prosecu-
tion barrister has not been part of the investigative
team and usually has had nothing to do with the
decision whether or not to prosecute the case or how
to shape the charges. The adversary system is a way
of providing for the orderly presentation and testing
of evidence at trial rather than some overarching
structure into which the trial fits. In the English
system, judges have more responsibility put on them
or, perhaps another way of putting it, can take more
responsibility for seeing that the jury reaches a
proper verdict. One manifestation of this difference
is that English judges have broad power to summa-
rize and comment on the evidence as part of their
instructions at the end of trial, and to summarize the
evidence even in routine criminal cases. Reinforcing
the authority of English trial judges is the fact that
appellate review is limited and reversals are very
difficult to obtain.
The United States with its metaphysical view of
the adversary system is very nervous about permit-
ting judges to summarize the evidence. Many
jurisdictions do not permit judges to do that and even
in jurisdictions where it is permitted, such as federal
court, judges are very reluctant to exercise that
power. Judges, in short, are expected to be neutral
and passive. Encouraging judicial passivity is the
fact that appellate reversals are much easier to obtain
in the United States and appellate courts are even
willing to reverse for error that does not call into
question the fairness of the trial.
Given the strong commitment to the adversary
system in the United States, the worry that the
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prosecutor in plea bargaining or in sentence bargain-
ing is usurping judicial power has much less force. If
a prosecutor believes that the bargain in question is in
the public interest, it is much harder for a judge to
reject it. The same is true from the defense perspec-
tive. In a country where a defendant can walk into
court and plead guilty even while declaring himself
innocent of the underlying crime, what is the author-
ity that suggests a judge should reject a sentence
bargain that the defense believes is in the interest of
the defendant?
IV. Conclusion
Every strong criminal justice system has to be
built on a strong trial system. By a strong trial
system, I mean a system (1) that is efficient and that
makes wise use its resources and (2) that can be relied
upon with confidence to convict the guilty and acquit
the innocent. I think the United States lacks a reliable
and efficient trial system and as a result the system
struggles mightily to avoid trial. (One way the
system avoids trials is to threaten defendants with
harsh punishments-mandatory minimums, tough
habitual offender statutes, tight guideline systems
and the like-that one doesn't see in other western
countries.1 )
Lacking a strong trial system, a uniquely
American debate has emerged in the United States
over whether sentencing should be "conviction based
sentencing" or "real offense sentencing," the distinc-
tion being that under "real offense" sentencing the
judge sentences based on what the defendant actually
did, not what the defendant was convicted of or pled
guilty to. Countries with strong trial systems don't
have to worry about this issue because there is
unlikely to be a significant gap. The defendant in
those countries has a simple option: admit what he
has done and receive a sentence discount for sparing
the system a full trial, or go to trial, be assured of
being convicted if guilty, and be sentenced without
such discount.
The federal system has opted for real offense
sentencing. However, the use of fact bargaining to
reduce a defendant's sentence under the guidelines
obviously undercuts real offense sentencing. I think it
would prove very hard to eliminate such sentence
manipulation and I doubt that the result would be
worth the effort. I would prefer that the system
address itself to the question of why a gap between
the real offense and the conviction offense should be
permitted to occur in the first place.
NOTE
I I have argued elsewhere that there is a synergy
between punishment and procedure, such that extremes of
either encourage extremes of the other. See William T. Pizzi,
Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American
Criminal Justice System, 13 Const. Comm. 55 (1996).
